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PSYCHIATRY AND SOCIETY:
Professionalism and the Control of Knowledge
John M. Booker Allen W. Imershein
Department of Sociology Institute for Social Research
Northern Arizona University Florida State University
Madness becomes mental illness through the joint project of psychia-
try and the community of consensus lent to it. The psychiatrist, like
the shaman (to paraphrase Leve'-Strauss), acts through the cultural
plasma of his times. And the psychiatrist provides a definition for
events, making mental illness of madness, while occupying a unique posi-
tion within the scheme of society.
Psychiatry has been attacked from many directions in recent years.
Despite these varied challenges, however, its power appears to have aba-
ted little if at all. How can we account for this fact? On the surface
one might assume that the scientific basis or the treatment success of
psychiatric practice provides the buttress to repel the ongoing attacks.
But we suggest here that the continuing power and the prestige of psy-
chiatry can be understood more clearly by examining its relation to so-
ciety at large rather than the relation to its patients. There appear
to be two analytically separate but empirically interrelated factors at
work. First, and of main importance, is the absence of an acceptable
alternative to psychiatric practice in American society and Western cul-
ture in general. The stress must clearly be placed upon the condition
of acceptability. Second, and growing out of the first, is the profess-
ional and organizational "status" psychiatry enjoys and the benefits im-
plied therein. The ensuing discussion will elaborate these points and
attempt a critical examination of the relationship between psychiatry
and society.
Knowledge Communities
Thomas Kuhn (1970) has provided a heuristically valuable analysis of
how knowledge serves to structure "scientific" communities. Kuhn argues
that scientific "paradigms" serve to guide the vast range of scientific
activities. In fact, knowledge is "community" as a shared way of seeing
the world and a commitment to a particular description of reality under-
lying it. This provides a common gestalt from which members act. Com-
munity membership is defined by shared adherence to a given paradigm.
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There are clear parallels between Kuhn's notion of paradigms and
scientific communities and the discipline of psychiatry. Psychiatrists
would probably be the first to defend their discipline as "scientific,"
given its nominal connection with general medicine. Moreover, their
professional activities are organized around a specialized body of
knowledge. Taken together, their perception of the nature of problems,
professional tasks, and appropriate solutions, provides a basis for
"doing" psychiatry.
As in Kuhn's scientific communities, new members are inculcated by
training; that is, they are shown how the body of knowledge, the para-
digm, explains phenomena. They learn to "see" the world the way the
paradigm depicts things. For example, where the physics student once
saw "weight," after training, he sees "mass" as the correct description
of reality. Likewise, upon being presented with an obvious "madman"
while on rounds, the student psychiatrist (not to mention social work-
ers, clinical psychologists, nurses, etc.) is informed that the patient
is not simply "mad"... no, he is schizophrenic, paranoid type, or some
other correctly "psychiatric" description. Such shaping soon has its
effect, and the student becomes adept at the raison d' etre of psychia-
try, diagnosis. Where madness was an inexplicable phenomenon, psychia-
tric nosology and nomenclature provide an organization to events - a
rational description of the supposedly irrational (cf. Coulter, 1973).
The psychiatric paradigm provides a reconceptualization of the prob-
lem of madness, its technological application suggests a means of solu-
tion (i.e., treatment), and the resulting social organization structures
the social relationships of practitioner and patient alike. Psychiatric
"science" provides an organization to knowledge that leads the psychia-
trist to "see" mental illness in the place of madness. As a commitment
to a particular description of reality, the psychiatric paradigm lends
typicality to the notion of mental illness, a "fact" largely taken for
granted by members of the psychiatric community.
Professionalism, Paradigms, and Technology
The general nature of a professional community as a group of adher-
ents organized on the basis of a specialized body of knowledge can be
seen as consistent with the above framework. A common way of defining
the concept "profession" is in terms of the control its members have
over a body of knowledge, i.e., the technology of the professional spe-
cialty. That control comes in two ways. First, in political (if not
actually legal) terms, only a "member" is allowed to put the knowledge
into use -- only members can practice the technology. This autonomy is
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the cornerstone of professional power (cf. Freidson, 1970). Second, and
really a function of the first, is a "prolonged specialized training"
(Goode, 1960) which limits the means of access to that knowledge and
which leads to membership with its rights, privileges and power.
Psychiatry is able to wield tremendous power, both over other pro-
fessionals in the field and, as well, over the millions of people re-
ceiving mental health services, over judges and juries, over politicians
and, all too frequently, over the organization and direction of everyday
life. In the legal arena, for example, the psychiatrist is recognized
as an "expert;" his professional status and power has been insured by
legislative act. The psychiatrist passes judgment, often of a final and
damning nature, over the membership status of persons previously thought
to be among the sane (cf. Szasz's (1961) discussion of the psychiatrist
as moral entrepreneur). Psychiatry is a necessary (and often defacto
sufficient) element in issues of legal competency and comitment. The
psychiatrist has been allowed to administer "treatments" (e.g., loboto-
mies, shock therapy, interminable seclusion and confinement - to mention
a few) that, in another context, would resemble "war crimes."
Yet, can we account for the powers psychiatrists daily exhibit by
virtue of their political affiliation or professional lobbying alone?
Such efforts help, to be sure, but are rightly placed under the heading
of organizational action, thereby after the fact of the psychiatrist's
existence. This is to suggest that the relationship of psychiatry and
society may exist at points additional to the level of organizational
structure. The question then becomes, "What is the nature of the link
that makes the profession of psychiatry possible?" and, secondarily,
"Why does this link provide for psychiatry instead of something else?"
Psychiatric Knowledge
Part of the answer would appear to lie in the concept of a profess-
ion and the application of a specialized body of knowledge, i.e., the
practice of psychiatric "technology." But how is assessment of this
practice to be accomplished? Are there criteria for evaluating the ap-
plication of psychiatric knowledge in the sort of means-to-ends schema
that technology implies?
An obvious gauge of knowledge for technology is its instrumental
efficacy, a measure of what Thompson (1967) terms "technical rationali-
ty." That is, given a goal, does the knowledge lend itself to a solu-
tion, i.e., is the knowledge applicable in a technical sense? If this
is the issue, then it does not resolve the problem of "explaining nsy-
chiatry," for "efficacy" is not the forte of psychiatric practice.
any case, short of producing obvious "cures," psychiatry may provide
little evidence understandable by non-members. The man in the street,
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not sharing in the underlying knowledge, is likely unable to perceive
the intangibles of "therapeutic" progress.
Given this apparent absence of an effective psychiatric technology,
we are faced with something of a contradiction. If psychiatry is not
manifestly effective in dealing with mental illness, how is it that the
psychiatric paradigm (often referred to as the "medical model") consti-
tutes the basis for present-day practice in mental health activities?
We suggest that measurement of the positive effects of application
of psychiatric expertise, i.e., instrumental efficacy, is not really at
issue. Returning to the concept of "profession," we are reminded of a
central tenet, not just the existence of a body of knowledge, but pro-
fessional control of that knowledge. One corollary of professional sta-
tus is self-regulation -- that only members are qualified to judge tech-
nical questions since they alone, by definition, possess the requisite
knowledge to make such judgements. Outside evaluations are simply not
considered legitimate.
Therefore, professional autonomy shifts the question from one of
direct evaluation of knowledge and practice to one of the psychiatrist's
status of expert. This amounts to a shift from concern with the "idea"
of psychiatry to the social "relationship" between psychiatry and socie-
ty (cf. Warren, 1977). As we have seen, this relationship does not con-
sist of the direct sharing of knowledge, and thereby cannot be explained
by reference to psychiatry alone.
This relationship between psychiatry and society is evidenced in a
number of ways. For example, psychiatry in the courtroom is only a spe-
cific instance of the psychiatrist as "expert" in society (cf. Berger
and Luckmann, 1967; Znaniecki, 1940). The real power base of psychiatry,
as with other socio-political institutions, must of course lie in socie-
ty at large. It can be argued that, like politicians, psychiatrists may
produce little in the way of obvious benefit, but as in the case of the
political "expert," the layman is hard pressed to offer up a plausible
alternative to back up his entreatment to "throw the rascals out!" The
layman, having little knowledge of psychiatric technology, has scarcely
any basis for judging the instrumental actions of psychiatrists. He
must rely largely upon their claims, if he seeks to judge them at all.
Outwardly the relationship is one of status and, consequentially, pro-
fessional power.
What then is the nature of this relationship through which psychia-
try receives support from society? We propose that there are two dis-
tinguishable, but not mutually exclusive, elements at work. First,
there are the underlying "common-sense" notions about the "madman" that
inhere in our culture, and second, the "referral logic" of professional
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practice. The link appears to reside in the notion of "mental illness"
itself. Mental illness involves not only an acceptable way of seeing
madness, but also fits into an acceptable pattern of relationships
whereby members of society delegate power and authority to "official"
agents or institutions.
Certain underlying assumptions, exemplars in Kuhn's terms, seem to
be shared by psychiatry and society. Primarily this amounts to an as-
sessment of "individual deficiency" readily applied to all who deviate
in certain directions in our society, e.g., the poor, the delinquent,
and the insane (cf. Freidson, 1970). An historical account of the "ima-
ges" of madness in the western world illustrates how the typifications
applied at any point in time have reflected other currents in society,
e.g., metaphors such as "possession" in religious times, or a "ship of
fools" in more secularly oriented contexts (Foucault, 1973). Further,
individual deficiency can be seen to be merely the other side of the
conceptual coin from a notion of productivity. Unproductivity in an
achievement oriented society is a common feature of most deviant cate-
gories and of particular significance to attitudes towards the insane
(Bastide, 1972). Like the poor, the criminal, and the mentally defi-
cient, persons exhibiting bizarre behavior do not integrate well into a
culture of "rationalization and routinization" (Weber, 1947).
The second element of the linkage involves the "referral logic" that
brings the psychiatrist and his patient together. The affiliation of
psychiatry with general medicine, both in an institutional and legal
sense, lends a tradition of authority and prestige backed up by increas-
ing evidence of technological success in medicine,2 despite the apparent
lack of technological success in psychiatry itself. The exemplar of
"treatment," derived from physical medicine and easily extended to the
realm of psychiatric "medicine," constitutes a crucial metaphor in mod-
ern thought, legitimating mental "illness" and consequently psychiatric
"practice."
This phenomena of cultural support for technological actions, parti-
cularly respective of human "materials," has in one instance been termed
"institutionalized thought structure" (Warren, 1971, 1974). It is sug-
gested (on the basis of empirical observation combined with keen insight
by Warren) that society will support an "intervention strategy" (e.g.,
the involvement of professionals with people who have "problems" and
need "help") when such actions are commensurate with the "supporting be-
lief/value system." The madman is seen to be defective and in need of
help -- so psychiatric referral follows logically. This "symbolic uni-
verse," of which mental illness and treatment are constitutive parts, is
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maintained by the social organization of psychiatric practice (Berger
and Luckmann, 1967:92-128) and can be considered, following Warren, an
institutionalized thought structure.
The single notion of "treatment" does the most to differentiate the
criminal and the pauper, with their respective brands of social "inter-
vention strategy," from the mentally ill. The criminal must be "re-
formed or rehabilitated," the poor are "cared for," while the mentally
ill are "treated." Treatment implies an end result of cure, i.e., the
removal of a pathologic condition. Reform and rehabilitation suggest
that something need be added to the old personality structure or it
must be reshaped. Those poor most acceptable as objects for interven-
tion (i.e., welfare) are seen as unable to improve or change their con-
dition; they must be "cared for." The course of institutional response
to these preeminent "social problems" can be distinguished by these re-
spective metaphors attached to them and the resulting socially legiti-
mated "strategies" and "agents" of control employed as solutions (cf.
Rothman, 1971).
Organizational Action
Similar to other organizations, psychiatry -- and mental health in
general -- acts within a domain and in relation to a task environment
(Thompson, 1967). The purpose of organizational action is to support
the underlying technology: providing for its needs, blocking disruptive
external influences, and above all, preserving the technological sys-
tem itself. This has amounted to the maintenance of the psychiatric
view of madness, its "paradigm."3
Given the power it receives from society at large, psychiatry has
in turn consolidated that power and protected its technology through
influencing other institutions in the system, mainly the federal govern-
ment and the legislative/judiciary system at both local and national
levels. Among organizations in general, Thompson (1967) asserts, pro-
fessed aims and goals cannot be relied upon as statements of the "actu-
al" basis of decision-making and organizational action.
If mental health organizations are not successful in treating and
curing the mentally ill (their "manifest" function, largely recognized
by all), then we can only look at the consistent pattern of "manage-
ment" of the mentally ill and conclude that the practice of psychiatry
serves some "latent" functions, perhaps most succinctly phrased as
"social control." This sort of "efficacy" seems both compatible with
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societal views on social problems in general and accessible for assess-
ment by the layman. As a function, social control may be "latent" only
from within a community which "professes" treatment, social control be-
ing historically the manifest reaction to all forms of deviance.
The mental health industry, under the dominance/leadership of psy-
chiatry, has served as a basis for warding off threats to psychiatry
itself as much as it has manifestly acceded to societal demands. In the
face of strong criticism over conditions in mental institutions (the
source was largely governmental -- in terms of skyrocketing costs --
and social critics concerned with "humane" treatment) the mental health
industry succeeded in shifting its place of operation to the community,
thereby removing the burden of the institution, while not radically al-
tering basic practices (Roman, 1971). Psychiatric practitioners them-
selves helped bring on the crisis of the hospitals, this serving (at
least latently) to focus attention upon the asylum and away from an ex-
amination of psychiatry itself. Psychiatry has also been successful or-
ganizationally in broadening its domain by redefining ever more "prob-
lems" as pschiatric in nature, e.g., drug abuse, marital counseling,
alcoholism. In these terms the community mental health "revolution"
surely appears to have "liberated" the psychiatric practitioner as much,
or very likely more, than the mental patient.
The Prospects for Change
We have claimed that the basic reason for psychiatric dominance is
the absence of an acceptable alternative technology. In the sense of
our extension of Kuhn's ideas, we can speak in terms of the lack of an
alternative or "competing" paradigm precluding change in the pattern of
professional dominance enjoyed by psychiatry. Can this claim be justi-
fied, however? For example, the behavioral modification proponents in
psychology and education have for some time claimed success at changing
problematic behavior patterns -- something psychiatrists rely upon psy-
chotherapy and drugs to accomplish, often with unpredictable and unfor-
tunate results.
The psychiatrist is the resource to which nearly everyone turns when
faced with madness. Analogous to the policeman and crime, the psychia-
trist has apparently done little to reduce the incidence of mental ill-
ness, yet his mode of action "makes sense." In lieu of an equally ac-
ceptable and more efficacious alternative, he appears likely to remain
an established part of the system of institutional structure in society.
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But given the schema set out above, there are potentially two alter-
native paths to change for psychiatry and mental health: (1) a change in
the technology (through altering psychiatric knowledge and the paradigm
underlying it) and/or (2) organizational (structural) change.
First, in terms of psychiatry's knowledge base, we can return to
Kuhn's description of change in communities of knowledge as "revolu-
tions." According to Kuhn, change takes place only when two conditions
are met: (1) the reigning paradigm is faced with "anomalies," i.e.,
things it cannot explain, and (2)there exists an alternative paradigm,
one that offers to replace the present paradigm's explanatory power
while holding out heuristic merit not presently available under the "old
way of seeing." But we have added a third criterion, "public accepta-
bility," to this list. Especially for knowledge that is to be applied
as professional technology, the outward manifestations of the technolo-
gy must be compatible with the cultural "belief/value system." Kuhn is
not altogether silent on this point, though it receives lesser emphasis.
Probably this lack of emphasis reflects an assumed and somewhat artifi-
cial distinction between the realms of science and technology which
places less need upon understanding the relationship between acceptable
"scientific" paradigms and the culture in which they exist. Yet, Kuhn
does acknowledge that the choice of a new paradigm is not wholly an
"objective" process; values and other subjective conditions do come into
play.
But what does this imply for change in mental health? Given that
psychiatric medicine has long faced anomalies -- things it often could
not explain away -- then the first condition exists for change. But an
acceptable competing technology must also be available for change to
occur.
Earlier we referred to behaviorism as a possible challenger, and on
the face of it this would appear so. Yet, change in that direction is
if anything, uncertain. Given the ability, albeit proclivity, of one
paradigm co-opting another when the challenger does not find ready cul-
tural acceptance (as Warren (1971, 1974) has noted with poverty pro-
grams), behaviorism may simply be "overwhelmed" by psychiatry. The
"strategies" of behavioral science are not commensurate with the cultur-
al metaphor, "treatment," held with regard to the mentally ill (cf.
Rieff, 1968, for one reading of this relationship). The stigma and
prognosis of mental illness are likely more compatible with medical and
medical/moralistic images than those accompanying a behavioristic per-
spective (cf. Orcutt, 1974; Freidson, 1970). Only in those circumstan-
ces where behavioral techniques can be used to the ends of psychiatric
-320-
"strategies" is behaviorism likely to survive in mental health settings.
In those instances where behaviorism is employed towards mental illness
(e.g., token economies, aversive conditioning, etc.) the context is typ-
ically psychiatric, usually institutional. It is unlikely that the lay-
man would accept the full implications of the behavioral paradigm as a
treatment modality. Whatever the theoretical implications, it is ex-
tremely difficult to tolerate madness in the community, let alone do so
while restructuring social conditions as an effective reinforcement
schedule.
Other proposed alternatives for handling the mentally ill include
viewing mental patients as "voluntaristic actors" who should be sent to
"retreats" rather than hospitals (Braginsky, et al, 1969). Similarly,
Fairweather (1974) has experimented with the concept of "lodges," or
self-sufficient community housing, as a viable alternative to institu-
tional confinement. Both point out the problematic nature of their pro-
posals, especially that the community finds them largely unacceptable,
but fail to see the basic role cultural "exemplars" play in structuring
societal resistance to such change. From the perspective presented
above, however, the problem can be seen as not merely a matter of devel-
oping new programs as alternatives, but of placing, literally placing,
these alternatives into a setting of established cultural images as well
as organizational structures which must be acceptable to layman and pro-
fessional alike.
The second alternative, structural change, would appear to be a more
likely course. However, the potential for change lies not in directly
influencing the basic exemplars of mental illness, thereby altering the
psychiatric paradigm, but in using structural relationships to alter the
conditions of practice by establishing new exemplars in connection with
the mentally ill. While some organizational change has taken place, per-
haps to the benefit of the psychiatrist, (e.g., the community mental
health movement) other change has benefited the mental patient in terms
of providing an opportunity for raising issues of legal and civil rights.
As recent court decisions regarding, e.g., "right to treatment," indi-
cate, the organization of psychiatry is most susceptible to change when
directed from other powerful members of its task environment, e.g., the
federal government, local and state bureaucracy, and the courts.
More change may be in the offing, but a crucial ingredient in produ-
cing a real "revolution" for the mental patient would appear to lie in
removing the unrestrained power of decision now in the psychiatrist's
hands. New legal exemplars for the mental patient, much like those for
minority groups, serve to restructure the relationship between individu-
als and powerful agents of society, in this case between the psychiatrist
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and his "patient." Those anomalies that lead to further restructuring
of psychiatric legal authority are likely the primary route to eventual-
ly replacing the "medical model" description of madness. Such new exem-
plars do not directly confront the old one... they simply make the use of
the psychiatric paradigm problematic. The conflict over legal versus
medical definitions of madness offers inroads to structural change which
in turn may influence the ability of psychiatry to sustain the predomi-
nant metaphors and maintain the present institutionalized thought struc-
ture of mental illness. As a result, professional dominance, or the
lack of it, may well be the determining issue with regard to change in
the face of madness in the future.
FOOTNOTES
1. Psychiatric practices can be roughly divided into two categor-
ies: psychotherapy and somatotherapy. Psychotherapy has not been
demonstrated to be effective (Epstein and Shontz, 1971) and is so
inefficient as to be limited to cases with the best prognoses (Mech-
anic, 1969), perhaps those least in need of mental health services
(Chu and Trotter, 1974). Drug therapy, by far the most frequent
somatotherapy, has shown mixed results at best, with no clear assess-
ment of whether or not that effectiveness is due to treating the en-
vironmental context through the patient (Prein and Kett, 1972).
2. This argument may be further extended to consider psychiatry's
"scientific" status as an effective means of securing cultural legi-
timacy through implied association with the "technical rationality"
of general medicine while not demonstrating success against techni-
cal criteria of efficacy (cf. Habermas, 1970).
3. While it may be argued that there are many paradigms in psychia-
try, leading to a multitude of techniques of practice, the central
exemplars of "mental illness" and "treatment" serve to unify the
field. Even Szasz (1961), while preferring the term "problems in
living" over that of "mental illness," continues to think in terms
of "treating" the individual. When this diversity among psychiatric
practitioners, including para-professionals, is contrasted with
structural explanations for madness, and resulting social change
strategies for relief, the variance within is certainly outweighed
by that between these two opposing paradigms (cf. Braginsky, Bragin-
sky, and Ring, 1969; Warren, 1971). Further, like God, psychiatry
may be "dead," but neither its intellectual death nor its mystical
overtones has done much to undermine the basic pattern of social re-
lationships that remain recognizably psychiatric, and ostensibly
therapeutic (cf. Torrey, 1971, 1974).
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4. An example of the length to which this trend has been carried
is given in a request that a panel of psychiatrists study drivers in
California to determine why the new 55 mph speed limit was being con-
sistently violated. In another, the wholesale application of psy-
chiatric criteria yielded a claim that over 80% of the residents of
Manhatten were in need of some sort of psychiatric help (Srole, et
al, 1962). These exercises attest to the considerable influence
psychiatry has over other professions and members of society in gen-
eral.
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